Statistical Inference and A/B Testing for First-Price Pacing Equilibria

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.Comment: - fix referenc

Statistical Inference for Fisher Market Equilibrium

Statistical inference under market equilibrium effects has attracted increasing attention recently. In this paper we focus on the specific case of linear Fisher markets. They have been widely use in fair resource allocation of food/blood donations and budget management in large-scale Internet ad auctions. In resource allocation, it is crucial to quantify the variability of the resource received by the agents (such as blood banks and food banks) in addition to fairness and efficiency properties of the systems. For ad auction markets, it is important to establish statistical properties of the platform's revenues in addition to their expected values. To this end, we propose a statistical framework based on the concept of infinite-dimensional Fisher markets. In our framework, we observe a market formed by a finite number of items sampled from an underlying distribution (the "observed market") and aim to infer several important equilibrium quantities of the underlying long-run market. These equilibrium quantities include individual utilities, social welfare, and pacing multipliers. Through the lens of sample average approximation (SSA), we derive a collection of statistical results and show that the observed market provides useful statistical information of the long-run market. In other words, the equilibrium quantities of the observed market converge to the true ones of the long-run market with strong statistical guarantees. These include consistency, finite sample bounds, asymptotics, and confidence. As an extension, we discuss revenue inference in quasilinear Fisher markets

Greedy-Based Online Fair Allocation with Adversarial Input: Enabling Best-of-Many-Worlds Guarantees

We study an online allocation problem with sequentially arriving items and adversarially chosen agent values, with the goal of balancing fairness and efficiency. Our goal is to study the performance of algorithms that achieve strong guarantees under other input models such as stochastic inputs, in order to achieve robust guarantees against a variety of inputs. To that end, we study the PACE (Pacing According to Current Estimated utility) algorithm, an existing algorithm designed for stochastic input. We show that in the equal-budgets case, PACE is equivalent to the integral greedy algorithm. We go on to show that with natural restrictions on the adversarial input model, both integral greedy allocation and PACE have asymptotically bounded multiplicative envy as well as competitive ratio for Nash welfare, with the multiplicative factors either constant or with optimal order dependence on the number of agents. This completes a "best-of-many-worlds" guarantee for PACE, since past work showed that PACE achieves guarantees for stationary and stochastic-but-non-stationary input models

Local AdaGrad-Type Algorithm for Stochastic Convex-Concave Minimax Problems

Large scale convex-concave minimax problems arise in numerous applications, including game theory, robust training, and training of generative adversarial networks. Despite their wide applicability, solving such problems efficiently and effectively is challenging in the presence of large amounts of data using existing stochastic minimax methods. We study a class of stochastic minimax methods and develop a communication-efficient distributed stochastic extragradient algorithm, LocalAdaSEG, with an adaptive learning rate suitable for solving convex-concave minimax problem in the Parameter-Server model. LocalAdaSEG has three main features: (i) periodic communication strategy reduces the communication cost between workers and the server; (ii) an adaptive learning rate that is computed locally and allows for tuning-free implementation; and (iii) theoretically, a nearly linear speed-up with respect to the dominant variance term, arising from estimation of the stochastic gradient, is proven in both the smooth and nonsmooth convex-concave settings. LocalAdaSEG is used to solve a stochastic bilinear game, and train generative adversarial network. We compare LocalAdaSEG against several existing optimizers for minimax problems and demonstrate its efficacy through several experiments in both the homogeneous and heterogeneous settings.Comment: 24 page